The tradition of Western philosophy—in particular, the ideals of reason and objectivity—has come down to us from white males, nearly all of whom are demonstrably sexist, even misogynist. What are the implications of this fact for contemporary feminists working within this tradition? Is this tradition so imbued with patriarchy that it is impossible for feminists to work on the same problems or to use the same tools? Or can feminists remain feminists while helping themselves to the philosophical tradition?In this splendidly (...) provocative volume, thirteen feminist theorists of many different persuasions address these questions. The chapters touch on many historical figures as well as many contemporary modes of thought, but a common theme running through them all is the question of whether there is a place for the traditional ideals of objectivity and rationality in a committed feminist view of philosophy and of the world.A Mind of One's Own stands as testimony to the variety, vigor, and vitality of current feminist philosophy. It will be essential reading and an essential reference for philosophers as well as for all scholars and students concerned about the nature of knowledge and our pursuit of it. (shrink)

This volume brings together sixteen essays by Louise Antony that reflect her distinctive approach to issues at the intersections of feminist theory, epistemology, philosophy of mind and philosophy of language. Antony proceeds from the Quinean precept that we treat knowledge as a natural phenomenon. This approach, Antony argues, offers feminists and other progressive theorists vital tools with which to expose and dismantle ideological conceptions of knowledge, human nature, and objectivity. She argues that naturalism's focus on the actual (as opposed to (...) hypothetical) circumstances under which human beings acquire knowledge illuminates and responds to feminist calls for a "situated" account of human knowledge. At the same time, Antony defends a number of views that have been the object of feminist criticism: psychological individualism, cognitive nativism, and the autonomy of semantics. These views, Antony argues, are in no way incompatible with feminist commitments, which is good, because they enjoy broad empirical support. Also in this volume, Antony addresses a number of practical issues of concern to feminists: Does pornography silence women? Are we ethically entitled to moral partiality? Is legitimate authority possible? Why are there so few women in philosophy? Finally, Antony presents and develops her own theory of gender. She argues that genders are socially constructed and multiply realized categories that bring into concordance sets of properties that have no natural or rational connection to each other. Genders must not be identified with the categories "female" and "male," but human sexual difference is the material, explanatory basis of gender systems: but for the existence of differences in reproductive role between females and males, gender regimes would not exist. (shrink)

In ”Embodiment and Epistemology,” Louise Antony considers a kind of ”Cartesian epistemology” according to which, so far as knowing goes, knowers could be completely disembodied, that is, pure Cartesian egos. Antony examines a number of recent challenges to Cartesian epistemology, particularly challenges from feminist epistemology. She contends that we might have good reason to think that theorizing about knowledge can be influenced by features of our embodiment, even if we lack reason to suppose that knowing itself varies relative to such (...) features. She also argues that a masculinist bias can result in mishandling of cognitive differences in cases where they actually exist and she examines a number of the ways in which the maleness of philosophy has, according to feminists, distorted epistemology. Even if a Cartesian approach offers one indispensable part of a comprehensive epistemology, according to Antony, we still need an epistemology that answers questions raised by our everyday, embodied lives. (shrink)

I analyze and criticize Naomi Scheman's argument for the claim that psychological individualism-the thesis that psychological states are entities or particulars over which psychological theories may quantify-has no legitimate philosophical backing and is instead an element of patriarchal ideology. I conclude that Scheman's argument is flawed and that her thesis is false. Psychological individualism is perfectly compatible with and may even be required by feminist political theory.

This chapter discusses central problems and prospects for ethical naturalism. Section 1 explains what is meant by “ethical naturalism” and surveys different versions of the view. Section 2 discusses the central philosophical challenge to ethical naturalism, viz., the “Normativity Objection.” Section 3 offers a battery of responses to it on behalf of the ethical naturalist. Section 4 explores a promising and novel approach to ethical naturalism, viz., a moral nativist theory that that combines a Chomskian approach to moral competence with (...) a structuralist metaphysics. (shrink)

The article presents a critique of John Searle's attack on computationalist theories of mind in his recent book, The Rediscovery of the Mind. Searle is guilty of caricaturing his opponents, and of ignoring their arguments. Moreover, his own positive theory of mind, which he claims "takes account of" subjectivity, turns out to offer no discernible advantages over the views he rejects.

I understand feminist epistemology to be epistemology put at the service of feminist politics. That is, a feminist epistemology is dedicated to answering the many questions about knowledge that arise in the course of feminist efforts to understand and transform patriarchal structures, questions such as: Why have so many intellectual traditions denigrated the cognitive capacities of women? Are there gender differences in epistemic capacities or strategies, and what would be the implications for epistemology if there were? I argue here that (...) such questions situate feminist epistemology much more in mainstream epistemological discussion than probably most feminists would admit, finding that, at least for issues in these areas, the naturalistic approach to the study of knowledge advocated by W. V. Quine has been extremely useful. (shrink)

In this compelling volume, ten distinguished thinkers -- William G. Lycan, Galen Strawson, Jeffrey Poland, Georges Rey, Frances Egan, Paul Horwich, Peter Ludlow, Paul Pietroski, Alison Gopnik, and Ruth Millikan -- address a variety of conceptual issues raised in Noam Chomsky's work. Distinguished list of critics: William G. Lycan, Galen Strawson, Jeffrey Poland, Georges Rey, Frances Egan, Paul Horwich, Peter Ludlow, Paul Pietroski, Alison Gopnik, and Ruth Millikan. Includes Chomsky's substantial new replies and responses to each essay. The best critical (...) introduction to Chomsky's thought as a whole. (shrink)

The old problem about mental causation arises out of dualism: if minds are not physical, how can they interact causally with bodies? The new problem about mental causation arises, ironically, out of materialism: if everything that happens, including intentional action, has a wholly physical cause, what room is left for distinctively mental causes? This is the problem to which the essays in Heil and Mele’s extremely useful volume are devoted. Although mental causation enthusiasts will recognize most of the arguments and (...) positions put forward in these papers, the collection is invaluable as a kind of canon, since the contributors include many of the most important parties to the debate, and collectively present nearly the full range of opinion on this topic. (shrink)